Sources
Every figure on this page is on a register in the code, beside the source it comes from. A test stops the build if the prose or the story says a number that is not on it. These are the sources, in the order the story meets them, each with the figures it gives and where they are used.
Axelrod and Hamilton (1981)
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 211(4489), 1390–1396. doi.org/10.1126/science.7466396 (opens in a new tab)
The payoffs of the prisoner’s dilemma, and the condition that cooperating every round pays more than taking turns at defecting; also the chance that the same two meet again, and the tournament that Tit-for-Tat won.
Figures351022.5
In the sourceFigure 1 and its caption, and the chance of meeting again, p. 1392; the tournament, p. 1393; note 17, p. 1396.
Case (2017)
Case, N. (2017). The Evolution of Trust. ncase.me/trust (opens in a new tab)
The place to play the repeated dilemma.
Vanberg (2008)
Vanberg, C. (2008). Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations. Econometrica, 76(6), 1467–1480.
Supplementary material
- Supplement A: Appendix C, Translation of Instructions. doi.org/10.3982/ECTA7673SUPPA (opens in a new tab)
- Supplement B: Appendix D, Translation of z-Tree Screens. doi.org/10.3982/ECTA7673SUPPB (opens in a new tab)
- Supplement: data and programs (switch.dat, baseline.dat, promises.do).
The game in which only one person decides, the partner switch that tells the two reasons apart, and the article’s conclusion, which the story paraphrases.
Used inChapter 3 · The matrix foldsChapter 4 · Two voicesChapter 5 · The blackoutChapter 6 · The real peopleChapter 8 · ClosingThe dilemmaVanberg's experiment
The payoffs of the decision: what the one who decides gets for keeping the money or rolling the die, and what the one who receives gets from each face.
Figures10141204615/6
In the sourceSupplement A, p. 2, table “Payoffs From the Decision”.
Used inChapter 3 · The matrix foldsChapter 5 · The blackoutChapter 8 · Closing
What the recipients who held a promise bet that the one deciding would roll, without a switch and with one, on a five-point scale.
Figures7068100
In the sourceThe data, switch.dat, with the method of promises.do; the scale, Supplement B, pp. 2–3, Screen 5B.
How many people played the partner-switch game, and over how many rounds.
Figures1928
In the sourceThe data, switch.dat; the rounds, Supplement A, p. 1.
How often the die was rolled after a promise, with the same partner and with a new partner promised by someone else.
Figures7354
In the sourceThe data, switch.dat, counted with the method of promises.do.
The whole design: the rounds, a new partner in each, the one round that is paid, the roles drawn again, the chat’s turns, both chats after a switch and what the one who receives sees.
Figures8
In the sourceSupplement A, pp. 1–2; Supplement B, pp. 1–3.
What the guesses paid, in cents, to the one who receives and to the one who decides.
Figures6560503515
In the sourceSupplement B, pp. 2–3, Screens 5B and 6A; Supplement A, p. 2.
Used inVanberg's experiment
Every cell of the partner-switch treatment: how often the die was rolled, and what the dictators believed their partner expected.
Figures80761000
In the sourceThe data, switch.dat, blocks TABLE I to TABLE III of promises.do.
Used inVanberg's experiment
The two simpler treatments, with the chat and without it.
Figures9267128328
In the sourceThe data, baseline.dat, block TABLE A1 of promises.do; the article’s Appendix A.
Used inVanberg's experiment
The first sentence of the article’s abstract, quoted.
In the sourceThe abstract.
Used inThe dilemma
The belief that a promise will be kept, which the curve holds fixed: the mean second-order belief of the dictators without a partner switch, what they believed their partner expected.
Figures76
In the sourceThe data, switch.dat, block TABLE I of promises.do.
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and Partnership. Econometrica, 74(6), 1579–1601. ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v74y2006i6p1579-1601.html (opens in a new tab)
Guilt aversion: the voice of what the other expects.
Used inChapter 4 · Two voices
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)
Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M. (2007). Guilt in Games. American Economic Review, 97(2), 170–176. ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v97y2007i2p170-176.html (opens in a new tab)
Guilt aversion: the voice of what the other expects.
Used inChapter 4 · Two voices
Kawagoe and Narita (2014)
Kawagoe, T., & Narita, Y. (2014). Guilt aversion revisited: An experimental test of a new model. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 102, 1–9. ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v102y2014icp1-9.html (opens in a new tab)
Personal guilt: letting down an expectation hurts only if you created it, so after a partner switch it is zero.
Di Bartolomeo, Dufwenberg, Papa and Passarelli (2023)
Di Bartolomeo, G., Dufwenberg, M., Papa, S., & Passarelli, F. (2023). Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication. Economics Letters, 222, 110931. doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110931 (opens in a new tab)
What the page on the finding cites it for, without figures: in the lab, an agreement, where both people promise, is kept more often than a promise made by one side alone.
Used inThe finding
Hernández Gallegos (2026)
Hernández Gallegos, M. X. (2026). Promises to whom: Identifying personal guilt and partner-specific commitment across populations [Working paper]. SSRN. doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7580218 (opens in a new tab)
The simulation engine
- Its repository. github.com/Montse2308/promises-to-whom-engine (opens in a new tab)
- Its release, archived on Zenodo. doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23222610 (opens in a new tab)
The curve: in each world of background trust, what each of the three reasons earns and where personal guilt rolls, as the engine measured it.
Figures0100156510538
In the sourceThe curve the engine exports, copied into this site unchanged.
What the page on the finding derives from the curve: the guilt available, the threshold it must pass, the analytic cut and the robustness variant. θ and c are given, and explained, only on that page.
Figures14.44420/36.6710.165.97010761003.554.200.277
In the sourceThe same curve: the guilt available in each row, θ and c, and the robustness variant.
Used inThe finding
The paper's other two results, as the page on the finding words them: who gets to speak does not change who survives, and what happens when a promise can stop binding.
Figures601/2
In the sourceSection 6 of the working paper.
Used inThe finding
What the page on the finding runs live with the paper's engine: how many generations each run lasts, and how many runs each of its three worlds has, with the paper's seeds.
Figures4002040
In the sourceThe engine's runs of the curve's illustration, results/r6-curve-illustration.json: its generations and its two sets of seeds.
Used inThe finding